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Case Studies » Domiciliary Care Allowance » Domiciliary Care Allowance - Case from 2017 Annual Report (ref:2017/05)

Background: The appellant applied for Domiciliary Care Allowance (DCA) in October 2016 in respect of the care of her son and was awarded the payment with effect from 1 November. On her application form the appellant indicated that she had not applied for the payment earlier as they had only recently been made aware of DCA by their friends. She appealed the decision, seeking to have it backdated. She stated that at the time of the child’s diagnosis in October 2015 they were not made aware of the allowance. She also referred to both herself and her husband experiencing health issues around this time. The Department disallowed the application for backdating stating lack of awareness was not considered good cause to backdate a claim. The Department stated that information relating to the DCA scheme is widely available and applicants are expected to make themselves aware of their rights and entitlements.

Consideration: Section 241(4A) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 provides that a claim for Domiciliary Care Allowance may be back-dated for a maximum of six months where it has been shown that there was good cause for the delay in making the claim. Based on the specific circumstances of this particular case, the Appeals Officer found that there  was a “good cause” to explain the delay in claiming DCA at an earlier date. While the Department contended that lack of knowledge does not constitute a “good cause”, the legislation is not prescriptive in that regard. While lack of knowledge in relation to failur to apply for other social protection schemes may not reasonably constitute good cause.

The Appeals Officer found that DCA should be regarded on a case by case basis as its reach was beyond the contingencies normally associated with recourse to the Department. The Appeals Officer found the failure to apply was due to an assumption on the appellant’s behalf that there was nothing to apply for. He found this assumption to be reasonable and understandable due to the dearth of information provided by all service providers at the time of her son’s diagnosis. He found that it was reasonable that the appellant would not have realised that, in the circumstances of the child’s diagnosis, there may have been recourse to a payment from the Department. He concluded that this constituted “good cause” for the delay in applying for the payment and the appeal was allowed for a period of six months, the maximum period allowable for backdating under the legislation.

Outcome: Appeal allowed.